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THE RESILIENCE OF NOXIOUS DOCTRINE:
THE 2016 ELECTION, THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS,
AND THE OBSTINACY OF BIAS
Leonard M. Niehoff* and Deeva Shah**
The Supreme Court has recognized the central role that free expression
plays in our democratic enterprise. In his dissenting opinion in United States v.
Abrams, Justice Holmes offered a theory of how free expression advances our
search for truth and our cultivation of an informed electorate. That model—often
called the “marketplace of ideas,” based upon the metaphor used by Holmes—has
proven to be one of the most persistent and influential concepts in First Amend-
ment jurisprudence.
The marketplace of ideas model essentially holds that free expression serves
our democratic goals by allowing differing proposed truths and versions of the facts
to compete with each other for acceptance. The theory maintains that the best ideas
and the most reliable information will emerge and prevail. The well-informed elec-
torate that results from this process will then make better decisions in our par-
ticipatory democracy.
During the 2016 presidential election, however, it became apparent that a
number of statements made by then-candidate Donald Trump proved difficult to
rebut in the public dialogue, even though they were clearly and demonstrably false.
Of particular concern, some of those statements fed into biases against and stereo-
types of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities and women. This disinformation
stubbornly resisted efforts at correction.
This Article discusses the marketplace of ideas model and its underlying
assumptions about how human beings process information and make decisions. It
then proceeds to explain, through recent social science research, why the dynamic
envisioned by the marketplace of ideas theory often fails to provide an effective
counter-narrative to statements that reinforce racial, ethnic, religious, and gender
biases and stereotypes. The Article concludes with some necessarily preliminary
and exploratory thoughts about potential curative measures.1
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INTRODUCTION
In the course of his presidential campaign, Donald Trump made a
substantial number of demonstrably false and misleading statements.2 Of
course, he held no monopoly here and political fact checkers also took
issue with many statements made by Hillary Clinton.3 Moreover, some of
Trump’s falsehoods were relatively benign insofar as they sought to en-
hance his own standing rather than to degrade that of others. For example,
it seems clear that Trump substantially overstated his net worth during the
campaign.4 Furthermore, on numerous occasions Trump denied making
statements that reliable evidence showed he had, in fact, made— a not
uncommon stratagem among politicians.5
But a large number of Trump’s false statements were more worri-
some because they related to racial, ethnic, religious and other minority
groups. For example, Trump falsely claimed the Black youth unemploy-
ment rate was at 59 percent at a time when the Bureau of Labor Statistics
put it at 27.1 percent.6 In August of 2016, Trump tweeted that “inner-city
crime is reaching record levels.”7 In fact, data from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”) shows that violent crime is at its lowest rate since
2. Glenn Kessler, Fact Checking in the Aftermath of a Historic Election, WASH. POST (Nov.
10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/11/10/fact-check
ing-in-the-aftermath-of-an-historic-election.
3. Lauren Carroll, Hillary Clinton’s Top 10 Most Misleading Claims, POLITIFACT (Oct. 27,
2016), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2016/oct/27/hillary-clintons-top-10-
most-misleading-claims.
4. Erin Carlyle, Trump Exaggerating His Net Worth (By 100%) in Presidential Bid, FORBES
(June 16, 2015, 1:14 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/erincarlyle/2015/06/16/trump-exag
gerating-his-net-worth-by-100-in-presidential-bid.
5. Aaron Sharockman, The Post-Truth Election? Comparing 2016 to Past Elections on the
Truth-O-Meter, POLITIFACT (Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/
2016/aug/16/post-truth-election-comparing-2016-past-elections- (stating that Donald Trump
did support the War in Iraq during the 2000s but when asked about it during the campaign, he
said he never supported it).
6. Warren Fiske, Trump Misleadingly Puts Black Youth Unemployment Rate at 59 Percent,
POLITIFACT (June 20, 2016),  http://www.politifact.com/virginia/statements/2016/jun/20/
donald-trump/trump-misleadingly-puts-black-youth-unemployment-r.
7. Louis Jacobson, Donald Trump is Wrong that ‘Inner-City Crime is Reaching Record Levels’,
POLITIFACT (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/aug/
30/donald-trump/donald-trump-wrong-inner-city-crime-reaching-recor.
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1995,8 and that it would take many years of “significant increases” to re-
turn to the record levels of crime in the early 1990s.9 Trump falsely
tweeted that Blacks killed 81% of White homicide victims in 2015, relying
on a non-existent statistic from a non-existent organization.10 FBI statistics
show that in fact only 15% of White homicide victims were killed by
Blacks in 2014.11 In these instances, Trump plainly misstated objective
facts that played into extant stereotypes.
Some of Trump’s statements about racial, ethnic, and other minori-
ties were more subjective, making them harder to characterize as objec-
tively true or false. Nevertheless, many of those statements are deeply
troubling because they either lack any evidentiary foundation or reflect a
misunderstanding of underlying realities. For example, Trump opined that
there is “no real assimilation” by second and third generation Muslims in
the United States.12 Based on its close study of the issue, however, the Pew
Research Center concluded that Muslim Americans (regardless of genera-
tion) appear to be highly assimilated in American society.13 In the same
vein, Trump claimed that through our refugee programs we are allowing
tens of thousands of terrorists into the country, even though there is no
data supporting this conclusion and even though he appears to have con-
flated terrorists with those who are, in fact, fleeing terrorism.14
Political fact-checking organizations and the mainstream media re-
ported extensively on Trump’s false statements of fact and unsubstantiated
8. CRIM. J. INFO. SERVICES DIV., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES 2014 tbl.1, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/
tables/table-1 (the most recent statistics available at the time of publication are for 2014).
9. Jacobson, supra note 7.
10. Jon Greenberg, Trump’s Pants on Fire Tweet that Blacks Killed 81% of White Homicide
Victims, POLITIFACT (Nov. 23, 2015, 3:35 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/
statements/2015/nov/23/donald-trump/trump-tweet-blacks-white-homicide-victims.
11. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS, RACE, ETHNICITY, AND SEX OF VICTIM BY
RACE, ETHNICITY, AND SEX OF OFFENDER, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-
in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/expanded-homicidedata/expanded_homicide_data_table_6_murder_
race_and_sex_of_vicitm_by_race_and_sex_of_offender_2014.xls (last visited Apr. 7, 2017).
12. Louis Jacobson, Donald Trump Wrong that ‘There’s No Real Assimilation’ by U.S. Mus-
lims, POLITIFACT (June 18, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.politifact.com/nbc/statements/2016/
jun/18/donald-trump/donald-trump-wrong-theres-no-real-assimilation-us-.
13. PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: NO SIGNS OF GROWTH IN ALIENA-
TION OR SUPPORT FOR EXTREMISM (2011), http://www.people-press.org/2011/08/30/mus
lim-americans-no-signs-of-growth-in-alienation-or-support-for-extremism (“A majority of
Muslim Americans (56%) say that most Muslims who come to the U.S. want to adopt American
customs and ways of life.”). In fact, Muslim Americans’ preferences for self-identification mirror
those of Christian Americans. Id.
14. Louis Jacobson, Donald Trump’s Pants on Fire Claim that US Is Letting in ‘Tens of
Thousands’ of Terrorists Now, POLITIFACT (May 25, 2016), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/statements/2016/may/25/donald-trump/donald-trump-says-us-letting-tens-thousands-
terror.
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generalizations.15 And they noted that he made such statements in stagger-
ing proportions. For example, by April of 2017, Politifact assessed 20% of
Trump’s statements as mostly false, 33% as false, and 16% as what it called
“pants on fire” false— cumulatively suggesting that the vast majority of the
time Trump was making either false or significantly misleading statements
to the public.16
In a famous dissenting opinion in United States v. Abrams,17 Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes offered a theory of how free expression advances
the goals of our democracy. In essence, he argued that free expression
allows differing ideas to compete for acceptance. The best ideas and most
reliable information will prevail, empowering the electorate to make well-
informed decisions. This “marketplace of ideas” model has proven to be
one of the most influential concepts in First Amendment jurisprudence.
This model suggested the following outcomes in the 2016 election:
(1) the public would consider the facts and views that contradicted
Trump’s statements; (2) those true facts and more informed views would
prevail in the competition; and (3) an informed electorate would decline
to vote for a candidate who made so many false, misleading, or baseless
statements. Instead, Trump secured a major victory in the Electoral Col-
lege and, although he did not win the popular vote, more than sixty mil-
lion people cast their ballots for him.18 This widely unanticipated result19
raises many complex questions and invites numerous potential lines of
inquiry.
We focus here on the false statements and unsubstantiated generaliza-
tions that Trump made about racial, ethnic, and religious minorities and
women. We ask: is there something about such statements that makes them
especially resistant to the testing and falsification powers of the marketplace
of ideas? As we will discuss, the social science research strongly suggests
that the answer to this question is “yes.”
If that is right (and we have good reasons to believe that it is), then
the implications go well beyond the 2016 election—and they are ominous.
After all, such a diagnosis suggests that one of our basic theories of how
our democracy operates is failing us. And it suggests that this theory is
15. See, e.g., Carlyle, supra note 4; see also Jacobson, supra note 7.
16. Donald Trump’s File, POLITIFACT, http://www.politifact.com/personalities/donald-
trump (last visited Apr. 7, 2017).
17. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
18. James Barrett, How Many Votes Did Trump and Clinton Get? The Final Vote Count,
DAILY WIRE (Dec. 21, 2016), http://www.dailywire.com/news/11777/how-many-votes-did-
trump-and-clinton-get-final-james-barrett (stating that the final vote count for Donald Trump
was 62,979,636).
19. Matt Viser & Annie Linskey, Trump Defies Predictions and Polls in Unexpected Win,
BOSTON GLOBE (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/11/08/first-polls-
close-ind/PbqkFzfkDo2QPWFCbxTrmI/story.html.
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failing us with respect to one of our core democratic values: equality across
racial, ethnic, religious, and gender lines.
In Part I of this Article, we offer a more detailed discussion of the
marketplace of ideas theory and the behavioral and decision-making as-
sumptions embedded within it. In Part II, we discuss the social science
around cognitive bias generally. In Part III, we apply more detailed social
science concepts to show why the marketplace of ideas dynamic is unlikely
to destabilize and rebut statements that reinforce biases, prejudices, and
stereotypes. In this context, we look more closely at a number of state-
ments made by then-candidate Trump in the course of the 2016 election
that were false and played on invidious stereotypes but that did not seem to
result in any adverse political consequences for him. We conclude with
some observations about potential avenues for further thought and inquiry
that might help address the problem we describe.
I. THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
Political theorists and legal scholars have often noted the central role
that freedom of expression plays in a system of democratic self-govern-
ance.20 They have disagreed about whether fostering public discourse
around issues related to political decision-making provides the exclusive
(or even the most persuasive) justification for a robust principle of free
speech.21 But the literature reflects a clear—and unsurprising—consensus
that (a) the democratic process and its outcomes are substantially enhanced
by the participation of informed citizens, and (b) we can cultivate the de-
velopment of such citizens only by allowing for the free and open ex-
change of ideas, opinions, and facts.
We find this sentiment articulated in numerous Supreme Court opin-
ions, some of which mobilize the most rhapsodic language the Court
knows how to use, including Justice Brandeis’s poetic concurring opinion
in Whitney v. California.22 In that opinion, Brandeis declared that “[t]hose
who won our independence . . . believed that freedom to think as you will
and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political truth.”23 Brandeis believed that:
20. See, e.g., James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free
Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491 (2011); see also Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free
Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477 (2011).
21. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, In Defense of the Marketplace of Ideas / Search for Truth as a
Theory of Free Speech Protection, 97 VA. L. REV. 595, 595 (2011) (“I agree with Professors Post
and Weinstein that a broad vision of democratic self-government is one important justification
for free speech, though I wouldn’t limit First Amendment protection to speech that is part of
‘public discourse.’ . . . [W]e should not dismiss the search-for-truth rationale—which is in
practice similar to the marketplace-of-ideas rationale.”); Vincent Blasi, Democratic Participation and
the Freedom of Speech: A Response to Post and Weinstein, 97 VA. L. REV. 531 (2011).
22. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 375.
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[W]ithout free speech and assembly discussion would be futile;
that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protec-
tion against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public dis-
cussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental
principle of the American government.24
In this view, free expression does not just facilitate democracy; it makes
democracy possible.
Over time, a dominant conceptual model has emerged to describe
how free expression plays this critical role in democracy. This is not to say
that there is only one such model— to the contrary, courts and legal
scholars have articulated a variety of explanations for why free expression
matters and how it helps us achieve our political, social, and individual
goals.25 But the most influential and consistently invoked model for how
the First Amendment works in our democratic system comes from the
opinion of Justice Holmes in Abrams v. United States.26 As Lee Bollinger
has stated, “[W]ithin the legal community today, the Abrams dissent of
Holmes stands as one of the central organizing pronouncements for our
contemporary vision of free speech.”27 In the same vein, Ronald K. L.
Collins has observed that “[i]n its own secular way, the opinion has be-
come canonical” and “many also view [its central] metaphor as key to any
healthy system of freedom of expression.”28 And Thomas Healy has writ-
ten that “Holmes’s dissent—the most important minority opinion in
American legal history—gave birth to the modern era of the First Amend-
ment” and that “nearly a century later, his dissent continues to influence
our thinking about free speech more than any other single document.”29
As we will discuss later, the model Holmes offers us in Abrams is
subject to many important criticisms, though it may remain our best the-
24. Id.
25. For example, Cass Sunstein has stressed that free expression creates a “public sphere”
that helps protect against the harmful effects of group polarization. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, at 59–97 (2017). And Vincent Blasi has noted that free expression serves as a
critical check on the abuses of political power. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First
Amendment Theory, 3 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 521 (1977). Indeed, Justice Brandeis’s concurrence
in Whitney reflects a number of rationales supporting free expression, including that it promotes
personal development and self-fulfillment. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (“the final end of the State
[is] to make men free to develop their faculties”).
26. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
27. LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 18 (1986).
28. Ronald K.L. Collins, Holmes’ Idea Marketplace— Its Origin and Legacy, FIRST AMEND-
MENT CENTER (May 13, 2010), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/holmes%E2%80%99-
idea-marketplace-%E2%80%93-its-origins-legacy.
29. THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT 7 (2013). For a recent discussion of Holmes’s
model and related concepts of free expression, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, at
52–57 (2017).
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ory of the value of free expression. But let us begin our consideration of
the case by focusing on its remarkable facts, which help explain the passion
and even outrage that we find in Holmes’s dissent.
Abrams arose from the following circumstances: Five people had
written, printed, and distributed leaflets around New York City that were
supportive of the Russian Revolution.30 By contemporary standards, the
leaflets seem unremarkable and utterly harmless. Although this was the ex-
tent of their activity, the five were charged with and convicted of violating
the federal Espionage Act.31 In one of its darker and less competent mo-
ments, the Supreme Court upheld the convictions and Justice Holmes
dissented.
Holmes begins the centerpiece of his dissent by noting the under-
standable, perhaps even good, intentions of those who want to censor
speech:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me per-
fectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your
power and want a certain result with all your heart you natu-
rally express your wishes in law and sweep away all
opposition.32
Holmes thus starts with this valuable insight: the impulse to silence speech
with which we disagree is understandable and extends to people with be-
nevolent designs.
Of course, this does not make the impulse any less dangerous. Years
later, Justice Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United
States,33 a case involving a different kind of constitutional concern, ob-
served that:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the government’s purposes are beneficent. Men
born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their
liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty
lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning
but without understanding.34
Holmes expressed great respect for Brandeis’s dissent,35 perhaps because he
had anticipated one of its central themes in Abrams.
In any event, Holmes’s dissent in Abrams continues on to state his
marketplace of ideas theory:
30. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 617 (1919)
31. Id. at 617–18.
32. Id. at 630.
33. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 479.
35. Id. at 469.
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But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself ac-
cepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an ex-
periment, as all life is an experiment.36
This model offers us an explanation for how free speech works to advance
our democratic goals: ideas, opinions, and facts compete for our allegiance
in a free market; through this competition we entertain alternative pos-
sibilities; as a result of this consideration and analysis we arrive at the truth;
and that truth empowers us to participate constructively as informed citi-
zens of our democracy.
This model so influences our thinking that we have come to rely
heavily, even if not always consciously, upon the process it describes to
correct the false facts and “noxious doctrines” that are circulated in the
public sphere. “[T]he fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones” and
the best way to address bad speech is through “more speech,”37 Justice
Brandeis declared in Whitney, and the marketplace of ideas model assures
us that this has it right. “At the length truth will out,” Shakespeare tells
us,38 and we like to think it so.
There are, nevertheless, numerous problems with Holmes’s model.
Some difficulties derive from his choice of metaphorical language.
Granted, a metaphor has certain virtues here: after all, in this passage
Holmes seeks to explain the process by which we go about finding the
truth amidst competing narratives, a process that does not lend itself to a
simple and straightforward indicative description. To the contrary, the
search for the truth may often strike us as a complex, if not even mysteri-
ous, undertaking, particularly in the context of debates around polity and
policy. Holmes hints at some of the ambiguity and uncertainty present
when he observes that this is “an experiment, as all life is an
experiment.”39
Still, metaphors have their limitations. The poetic ambiguity that
helps give them their rhetorical force carries with it an inherent uncer-
tainty of meaning and application. Language that tries to get at some grand
and abstract truth may offer little or no insight into the coarser stuff of
existential reality. Metaphors may facilitate understanding—or may frus-
trate it.
36. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
37. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372.
38. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act 2, sc. 2.
39. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
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We see this at work when we look at the assumptions that the mar-
ketplace of ideas model entails and ask hard questions about whether they
align with the world as we find it. A comprehensive critique of the model
lies beyond the scope of this Article.40 We will here note a few of its most
conspicuous and troublesome failings because they may help explain at
least some of what may have occurred during the 2016 election.
As an initial matter, this model assumes that competing ideas will at
least have a fairly equal opportunity to come into the marketplace and
strive for consideration and allegiance. But the marketplace of ideas may
be like other markets in the sense that there may be substantial barriers to
entry. This may hold particularly true for ideas about racial, ethnic, and
religious minorities.
Further, the model assumes that those participating in the market
believe that the discovery of the truth qualifies as an important, if not
essential, value. But political contests often have a great deal to do with
things other than finding the truth: the personalities of the candidates; an
undifferentiated impulse toward change; a disproportionate backlash
against existing policy; and so on. A vote may reflect a considered decision
about where the truth resides, or it may constitute a sort of primal scream.
If the players in the market do care about the truth, then the model
assumes that they will act rationally and logically in trying to sort things
out. In this sense, the model embodies an Enlightenment-era optimism
about how human beings process concepts and information. But we know,
of course, that people run ideas and data through many kinds of cognitive
filters that have little or nothing to do with reason or logic.
Next, the model assumes that individuals will do the hard work nec-
essary to separate truth from falsehood, and good ideas from inadequately
supported ones. The model, consistent with the realities of Holmes’s time,
rests upon assumptions about how quickly information moves, how much
of it we receive at one time, how much time we have to test and analyze it,
and how easily we can find the resources necessary to confirm or rebut
what we are told. But now, every human being who owns a computer is
overwhelmed by informational inputs that come in such numbers and at
such a pace that they resist this sort of critical consideration.41
Finally, the model assumes that these truth-loving, rational, open-
market players will not only discover the truth, but will act in a manner
consistent with what they have learned. Under this theory, human beings
reason toward the truth not just for its entertainment value or as an in-
triguing exercise, but because what they learn will affect their behaviors. It
obviously does not always play out that way.
40. For a brief but expansive critique of the model, see Frederick Schauer, FREE SPEECH:
A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982) at 25–30.
41. For example, on average around 6,000 tweets are sent out on Twitter every second,
adding up to about 500 million tweets every day. Twitter Usage Statistics, INTERNET LIVE STATS,
http://www.internetlivestats.com/twitter-statistics (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
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The current science around cognitive bias sheds some light on our
understanding of how the marketplace of ideas is likely to function in real-
ity. It also helps explain why the model is almost certain to disappoint us,
particularly with respect to ideas and purported “facts” that feed our biases
and stereotypes. In the next section of our paper, we consider that science
in its general terms.
II. THE SCIENCE OF COGNITIVE BIAS
In 2007, five professors from Yale Law School, the George Washing-
ton Law School, the University of Washington, the University of Colo-
rado, and the University of Oregon published a study predicting the
polarization of American culture.42 The rhetoric of the 2016 presidential
election and the public’s reaction to that rhetoric reflect the accuracy of
the study’s prediction. In sum, the study found that “[t]here is a culture
war in America, but it is about facts, not values.”43
The study considered how Americans generally care about the same
core issues: the economy, national security, and the health and safety of
their loved ones and themselves.44 The researchers found ample evidence,
however, that Americans are “sharply divided about what sorts of condi-
tions endanger these interests and what sorts of policies effectively
counteract risk.”45 These divisions result in differing views about the best
policies around issues like immigration, crime control, and foreign trade.
According to the study, in considering the appropriate policy re-
sponse, individuals will continue to disagree about the underlying facts,
even though those facts are established.46 Even when faced with facts di-
rectly contradictory to one’s assertions, people are likely to chose policies
that those underlying facts would not support. Individuals often resist solu-
tions that logically follow from the underlying facts if the suggested solu-
tions do not align with their own views and have not yet been
implemented.47 In sum, the researchers concluded that individuals tend to
process factual information about risks in a manner that fits their cultural
predispositions.48
Social science tells us that even when presented with facts that are
directly contradictory to our beliefs, we often do not act as rationally as we
42. Dan M. Kahan et al., The Second National Risk and Culture Study: Making Sense of—and
Making Progress In—The American Culture War of Fact (Yale Law School, Public Law Working
Paper No. 154, 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017189.
43. Id. at 16.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 5.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 16.
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think we do.49 A wide and continuous set of environmental and biological
factors influence our decisions and lead us to ignore evidence, logic, and
the laws of probability.50 We process information through filters that have
nothing to do with the objective truth of any given fact.
All human beings resort to stereotyping and generalizing in their de-
cision-making.51 In some instances, these behaviors help people make de-
cisions quickly and efficiently and have no significant negative
consequences.52 For example, based on very limited experience, an indi-
vidual might make an over-generalized and stereotyping judgment about
whether the safest and least expensive transportation from an airport to a
hotel is a taxicab, an Uber, or a wholly unaffiliated car. That judgment
may have no basis in objective statistical realities, but probably no dire ad-
verse consequences will come from its failings.
Unfortunately, in many instances, our generalizations have much
more pernicious bases and consequences. We refer here to “widely held
but grossly oversimplified images of particular types of people”—images
that often drive surprising and harmful decisions.53 These stereotypes tend
to rest on “miscalculations and mistakes” that a simple review of the rele-
vant data and facts would easily correct.54
Daniel Kahneman, a psychologist and Nobel Prize winner, has spent
his career studying how cognitive biases, such as stereotyping, affect deci-
sion-making.55 Kahneman begins from the premise that stereotyping is a
completely natural phenomenon.56 The human brain frequently makes
quick, instinctive, and reflexive decisions, especially in stressful or time-
sensitive situations.57 Kahneman calls this “System 1” thinking, and de-
scribes it as “instinctive, emotional, automatic, subconscious,” and, most
importantly, “frequent[ly]” used. The human brain relies on System 1
thinking throughout the day, from analyzing someone’s tone or gestures to
slamming instinctively on the brakes of a car.58
49. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 4 (2013).
50. See generally Jackson Pahlke, Unconscious Ideological Preferences: Imagined or Real?
(March 18, 2014) (unpublished B.A. thesis, University of Nebraska-Lincoln) (on file with
authors).
51. Id.
52. KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 13. See also id. at 168–69.
53. Bridget M. McCormack & Leonard M. Niehoff, When Stereotypes Attack, 41 LITIG.
28 (Summer 2015).
54. Id.
55. Kedar Pavgi, The FP Top 100 Global Thinkers, FOREIGN POLICY (Nov. 28, 2011),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/11/28/the-fp-top-100-global-thinkers-4.
56. KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 168–69.
57. Id. at 25.
58. McCormack & Niehoff, supra note 53, at 34.
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Kahneman contrasts the autopilot mentality of System 1 thinking
with the characteristics of our more analytic System 2 thinking.59 System 2
thinking is slow, effortful, conscious, and generally based in logic.60
Kahneman’s exhaustive research shows that people use System 2 less fre-
quently than System 1 thinking.61
Kahneman explains why we more commonly depend upon System 1
thinking. System 1 thinking uses very little mental energy and permits
quicker decision-making.62 It requires little or no effort and quickly be-
comes part of an individual’s subconscious response to the conditions of
life.63 This helps clarify why we struggle to recognize, resist, and change
our generalized and stereotypical thinking, even in the face of evidence
that our thinking is false. To make matters worse, the human mind can
create stereotypes and cognitive biases for a multitude of often-unexplain-
able reasons, making it even more difficult to unseat them through rational
opposition.
Social science identifies an additional challenge as well. Emotion fre-
quently infuses reasoning that an individual may believe rests on fact and
logic. Social scientists describe this as “motivated reasoning.”64 And, as
found in a study done by psychologist Arthur Lupia at the University of
Michigan, it is not just that emotion infects all of our reasoning, “but our
positive or negative feelings about people, things, and ideas arise much
more rapidly than our conscious thoughts, in a matter of milliseconds.”65
Scientists maintain that this behavior reflects the traces of our evolutionary
history.66 In our early history we applied fight-or-flight responses against
predators and we now apply the same fight-or-flight response by pushing
away data that we experience as threatening.67
Chris Mooney cites Professor Charles Taber, of Stony Brook Univer-
sity, to explain how such behaviors become stubbornly ingrained:
Consider a person who has heard about a scientific discovery
that deeply challenges her belief in divine creation—a new
hominid, say, that confirms our evolutionary origins. What
happens next, explains political scientist Charles Taber of Stony
Brook University, is a subconscious negative response to the
new information—and that response, in turn, guides the type
59. KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 25–30.
60. Id. at 20.
61. Id. at 13, 168–69.
62. Id. at 20.
63. Id.
64. Chris Mooney, The Science of Why We Don’t Believe Science, MOTHER JONES (May/
June 2011), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/03/denial-science-chris-mooney.
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
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of memories and associations formed in the conscious mind.
“They retrieve thoughts that are consistent with their previous
beliefs,” says Taber, “and that will lead them to build an argu-
ment and challenge what they’re hearing.”68
In other words, when our views are challenged, we construct an “argu-
ment” in defense of them that depends not upon facts or data but upon
whatever cognitive scraps we can locate that tend to confirm what we
hope to be true—and we do not even know we are doing this.
To put the dilemma another way: “when we think [we are] reason-
ing, we may instead be rationalizing.”69 As Professor Jonathan Haidt at the
University of Virginia notes, cognitive biases lead us to believe “we’re be-
ing scientists, but we’re actually being lawyers. Our ‘reasoning’ is a means
to a predetermined end—winning our ‘case’—and  is shot through with
biases.”70 After an individual has an initial belief about an issue, especially
one that is tied to strong emotions, the individual will spend a dispropor-
tionate amount of thought trying to refute anything contrary to that
view.71 In the same vein, individuals will give greater weight to evidence
bolstering what they already believe, the phenomenon known as “confir-
mation bias.”72
With time, these biases and illogical connections become a part of
System 1 intuitive thinking.73 An individual’s brain makes decisions about
a fact before that individual even becomes consciously aware of making
that decision.74 Through his research, John-Dylan Haynes found that a
brain scanner could tell approximately seven seconds before a study partici-
pant could vocally explain which hand he or she would use to press a
button.75 This sort of lapse between action and understanding only in-
creases with more complex decisions.
Research regarding the cognitive biases in human decision-making
has only recently become prevalent in the fields of psychology and political
science. In the 1960’s and 70’s, cognitive scientists initially posited that
human judgments were severely limited by “bounded rationality,” mean-
ing the constraints of available information, available time, and available
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 233
(Christopher Rogers & James R. Belser, eds., 1993).
73. Id.
74. Brandon Keim, Brain Scanners Can See Your Decisions Before You Make Them, WIRED
(Apr. 13, 2008), https://www.wired.com/2008/04/mind-decision.
75. Id.
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cognitive ability.76 Tversky and Kahneman were the first to argue that
people use mental shortcuts to form judgments and make decisions.77
They also argued that these mental shortcuts, called heuristics, frequently
focus on one aspect of a complex problem, while ignoring other important
aspects.78 Tversky and Kahneman argued that while these heuristic rules
formed by the brain are often helpful, they also enforce systemic deviations
from the rules of logic and probability.79 These irrational or illogical
choices are called cognitive biases, which can take many forms,80 as we
discuss below.81
Others have further expanded Kahneman’s research to determine
how cognitive biases develop, what makes them so persistent, and why
such biases are so difficult to change. As a 2005 study by Evans and Curtis-
Holmes shows, dual process theory can explain the belief bias effect, refer-
encing the fact that people are only likely to believe facts in line with their
prior beliefs.82 System 1 controls the first response many individuals have
to hearing a new set of facts, which places belief-based reasoning above
logic-based reasoning.83System 1’s fast, heuristic processes, such as belief
bias, compete with (and often defeat) the slower analytic processes of Sys-
tem 2 that would more frequently lead to correct logical decisions.84
These general principles of cognitive bias suggest that our thinking is
not driven by the sort of rational and analytic processes that the market-
place of ideas anticipates; our thinking is driven by rapid, unconscious
processes that depend heavily on ingrained assumptions that tend to con-
firm what the individual already believes and finds non-threatening. Build-
ing on the general principles described in this part of the Article, Part III
considers some of the more specific dynamics that social scientists say are at
work in our thought processes and that may make faulty generalizations
and invidious stereotypes particularly difficult to disrupt. And we will con-
sider those dynamics in the context of some of the statements made by
then-candidate Trump.
76. See, e.g., Herbert Simon, ECONOMIST (Mar. 29, 2009), http://www.economist.com/
node/13350892.
77. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 SCI. 1124, 1125 (1974). These theories have been criticized for being too focused on how
heuristics lead to errors, instead of also focusing on heuristics as rational thought. Id.
78. Id. at 1129.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See infra Part III.
82. John St. B. T. Evans & Jodie Curtis Holmes, Rapid Responding Increases Belief Bias:
Evidence for the Dual-Process Theory of Reasoning, 11 THINKING & REASONING 382 (2005).
83. Id. at 383–84.
84. Id. at 385.
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III. COGNITIVE BIAS AND CANDIDATE TRUMP
At this point, we must shift our thinking from a simple concept of
cognitive bias to a more complex collection of concepts of cognitive biases.
Cognitive biases can differ in their origins, causes, development, and mani-
festations. We will discuss some common forms of cognitive bias, relating
them to examples from then-candidate Trump’s statements as we go.
A. Anchoring and Adjustment Bias
The cognitive bias called “anchoring” refers to the human tendency
to rely on the first piece of information we receive about an event or the
tendency to focus on only one aspect of an event. The bias means that an
individual’s ultimate judgment is influenced by the anchor.85 This ten-
dency results in errors in reasoning and understanding. We process new
facts through that initial information and accept them only to the extent
that they match what we already “know.”86
Even when people know the anchor fact is wrong, most find it diffi-
cult to adjust away from it.87 That is why the anchoring bias may also be
known as the adjustment bias. In a study by Strack, Fritz, Mussweiler, and
Thomas, the researchers gave subjects “anchors” that were clearly un-
true.88 The researchers asked some subjects if Mahatma Gandhi died
before or after age 9, and others if Gandhi died before or after age 140.
Although the subjects understood that neither of these anchors were even
close to correct, the group given age 9 as an anchor stated an average age
of Gandhi’s death as 50. The group given 140 stated an average age of
67.89
Anchoring bias appears to have played a significant role in the 2016
election dialogue. Consider first an example unrelated to the central con-
cerns of this Article: the matter of Trump’s wealth and success as a busi-
nessman. From the beginning, Trump pointed toward this success as his
primary qualification to serve as President, and his supporters consistently
pointed to this background as an important factor in their decision-
making.90
It therefore becomes important that Trump’s first financial disclosure
statement in 2015 claimed that his net worth was approximately $10 bil-
85. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, supra note 77, at 1128.
86. ZOLTA´N VASS, A PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF DRAWINGS AND PAINT-
INGS 83 (2012).
87. Timothy D. Wilson et al., A New Look at Anchoring Effects, 125 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 387, 387 (1996).
88. Fritz Strack & Thomas Mussweiler, Explaining the Enigmatic Anchoring Effect: Mecha-
nisms of Selective Accessibility, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 437, 437 (1997).
89. Id. at 442, tbl.5.
90. See Shawn Tully & Roger Parloff, Business the Trump Way, FORTUNE (Apr. 21, 2016),
http://fortune.com/donald-trump-businessman.
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lion.91 Both Forbes and Bloomberg calculated his wealth as substantially less,
somewhere between $2.5 and $4 billion.92 During the campaign, Trump’s
“success” was widely questioned, often by reference to objective data.93
For example, some observers noted that if Donald Trump had just invested
the amount of money his father initially gave him, he would be vastly
wealthier than he is now, showing his business acumen may not be so
great.94 Nevertheless, many individuals believe that Trump is extremely
wealthy.95
Or consider another example, more central to the thesis of this Arti-
cle. Early on in his candidacy, Trump put forth a platform banning Mus-
lim travel, a position that no other major politician had discussed, at least
in public.96 By doing so, Trump anchored the following “facts” in the
public dialogue: (1) all Muslims pose a threat to non-Muslim Americans;
(2) the United States needs a policy to address this imminent threat; and
(3) Trump is the only candidate who has developed such a policy. The
notion that Trump had a policy to address this important issue became
anchored, despite the fact that there is no empirical evidence that the vast
majority of Muslims pose any such threat and despite the fluid nature of
Trump’s policy, which moved from bans to registration to extreme vet-
ting—whatever that means.97 These issues notwithstanding, Trump set the
tone for discussions about immigration and terrorism, using his positing to
frame the debate and influencing future decisions by voters regarding the
validity of policies that would have initially seemed outrageous and off-
limits to many.
The proposed ban on Muslim travel builds on other biases as well.
The creation of an in-group and an out-group capitalizes on human fears,
a reaction engrained through evolutionary psychology.98As we discuss be-
low, stereotypes that build upon each other may prove the hardest to
91. James Pethokoukis, Donald Trump is Hypnotizing the GOP. Literally., WEEK (Jan. 22,
2016), http://theweek.com/articles/600497/donald-trump-hypnotizing-gop-literally.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, Why Donald Trump Isn’t the Successful Businessman He
Claims to Be, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 7, 2016, 10:32 BST), http://www.in dependent.co.uk/news/
world/americas/us-elections/why-donald-trump-isn-t-the-successful-businessman-he-claims-
to-be-us-elections-republican-politics-7173666.html.
94. Claire Groden, Donald Trump Would Be Richer if He’d Have Invested in Index Funds
(Aug. 20, 2015), http://theweek.com/articles/600497/donald-trump-hypnotizing-gop-literally.
95. Allan Smith, Voters Were Polled on How Much They Think Hillary and Trump Are Worth
— and the Answers Were All Over the Place, BUSINESS INSIDER (June 2, 2016, 10:34 AM), http://
www.businessinsider.com/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-worth-poll-2016-6.
96. Keith Lee, Negotiate Like Trump: Use This One Technique to Get Massive Results, ABOVE
THE LAW (Dec. 10, 2015), http://abovethelaw.com/2015/12/negotiate-like-trump-use-this-
one-technique-to-get-massive-results.
97. Alana Abramson, What Trump Has Said About a Muslim Registry, ABC NEWS (Nov.
18, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-muslimregistry/story?id=43639946.
98. L. Cosmides et al., Perceptions of Race, 7 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 173 (2003).
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break, as there may be many levels of bias engrained into a System 1 re-
sponse to information levels that are invisible to the individual making the
decision.
Confirmation bias, discussed briefly above, is another common type
of anchoring bias.99 Confirmation bias describes our tendency to value
facts and opinions that align with those we have already formed.100 By
only referencing information and viewpoints that affirm previously held
beliefs, people confirm their biased views instead of considering conflict-
ing data and ideas.101 As noted above, not only do people look for others
who agree with them, they frequently dismiss or expend extra energy
scrutinizing discordant views.102 The Internet only contributes to this
confirmation bias as people become more and more likely to limit the
news they read to sources that agree with their own beliefs. The prolifera-
tion of ‘fake news’ on Facebook prior to the 2016 presidential election
shows the concern of confirmation bias, and how people are only in-
formed by news sources within their own “bubble.”103
Trump engaged in many strategies throughout his campaign that fa-
cilitated confirmation bias. One such strategy consisted of his villianization
of the mainstream media, which had reported numerous negative stories
about him.104 By discounting the media as biased and untrustworthy,
Trump discouraged his followers from considering opposing facts and
ideas, and encouraged them to listen only to him and to each other.105
The strategy resulted in a vast, and successful, experiment in the over-
whelming power of confirmation bias.
99. PLOUS, supra note 72.
100. See id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Drake Baer, The ‘Filter Bubble’ Explains Why Trump Won and You Didn’t See it Coming,
N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 9, 2016, 1:04 PM), http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2016/11/how-facebook-
and-the-filter-bubble-pushed-trump-to-victory.html.
104. Kenneth T. Walsh, The Media War, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 25, 2016, 6:00AM), http://
www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2016-11-25/donald-trump-is-declaring-war-on-
the-media.
105. See, e.g., Charlie Spiering, Donald Trump: CNN Not ‘Fake News’ — It’s Actually ‘Very
Fake News,’ BREITBART (Feb. 16, 2017), http://www.breitbart.com/big-journalism/2017/02/
16/donald-trump-cnn-not-fake-news-actually-fake-news (quoting Trump as saying, “You just
take a look at that show . . . . The panel is almost always exclusive anti-Trump . . . . and the
hatred and venom coming from his mouth; the hatred coming from other people on your net-
work.” The article then notes: “[Trump] added that CNN was not respected by the American
people, especially from his supporters. ‘The public gets it, you know. Look, when I go to rallies,
they turn around, they start screaming at CNN . . . . They want to throw their placards at
CNN.”). See also Louis Nelson, Trump Blasts ‘Fake News’ CNN’s Polls, POLITICO (Mar. 20,
2017, 9:28 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/03/trump-cnn-fake-news-polls-236250
(pointing out that Trump tweeted that ‘fake news’ CNN had stopped polling, when it had not).
260 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 22:243
B. Attribute Substitution Bias and the Asch Effect
Attribute substitution occurs when an individual has to make a judg-
ment about a target attribute (e.g., Donald Trump’s ability to be a political
leader) and instead substitutes a more easily calculated heuristic attribute,
meaning a shortcut attribute (Donald Trump’s purported business acu-
men).106 This substitution is a System 1 automatic process, which then
influences even System 2’s reflective decisions about the same subject mat-
ter.107 To put it simply, an individual is often unaware that two unlike
attributes have become conflated, even when the two are  logically
dissimilar.
Anuj Shah and Daniel Oppenheimer, two psychologists studying
how the brain reduces effort in decision-making, note that biases like attri-
bute substitution are very common because they help people reduce the
time and energy expended in making decisions.108 This sort of substitution
is especially common when considering policies that impact a large group
of people. As Kahneman showed through his research in 2002, stereotyp-
ing people typically falls into this kind of cognitive bias.109 Judging some-
one by the color of their skin is frequently easier (meaning less
computationally complex for the brain) than judging that person by her
intelligence, morality, work ethic, or some other, more relevant factor.110
In this way, a stereotype about the relative violence of Whites, Hispanics,
and Blacks becomes an easy substitute for actual data.
Cass Sunstein argues that attribute substitution is especially pervasive
when people are making decisions about moral, political, or legal mat-
ters.111 When presented with a difficult political issue (e.g., immigration),
people find a more familiar problem that they personally experience (e.g.,
fear of terrorism) and apply that orientation to the harder problem. This
dynamic was evident during the 2016 election when Trump capitalized on
106. BENJAMIN R. NEWELL ET AL., STRAIGHT CHOICES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DECISION
MAKING 71–74 (2007).
107. See Carey K. Morewedge & Daniel Kahneman, Associative Processes in Intuitive Judg-
ment, 14 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 435, 435–40 (2010).
108. Daniel M. Oppenheimer & Anuj K. Shah, Heuristics Made Easy: An Effort Reduction
Framework, 134 PSYCHOL. BULL. AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N 207 (2008).
109. See supra Part II.
110. Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution
in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT
42, 49–81 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
111. Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, 28 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN SCI. 531 (2005).
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fears of job loss112 and terrorism113 (both known attributes) to advance his
political agenda (essentially an unknown attribute with unclear solutions to
the issues of job loss and terrorism).
Trump’s proposed ban on Muslim immigrants provides an example
of attribute substitution. Trump stated, without any citation to actual data,
“Countless innocent American lives have been stolen because our politi-
cians have failed in their duty to secure our borders.”114 In this statement
and others like it, Trump addresses a complex issue (national security) by
appeal to a personal anxiety (fear of loss of life). This process conflates
terrorism and immigration.
Sunstein also suggests that heuristic shortcuts about political matters
do not occur only through the conflation of two concepts, such as immi-
gration and terrorism.115 When an individual is asked his own opinion on
a difficult political matter, he may substitute the opinion of a trusted politi-
cal or religious leader as his own.116 People assume that religious or politi-
cal leaders will have thought through the problem more than they have,
trusting others to make the decision for them.117
This deference is common even when a political leader may have
few, if any, qualifications to speak on the subject at issue. Daniel Oppen-
heimer, a psychology professor at the UCLA, has stated that “as voters, we
do not reflect on our own core beliefs and then seek [candidates to match
those beliefs].”118 Rather, voters do the opposite: “[as voters, we] decide
which candidates we like based on subjective cues, then mold our beliefs
to fit [the candidate’s beliefs].”119 According to Oppenheimer:
Most people have no idea where most candidates stand on most
issues, so they just assume that the candidate agrees with
112. For example, in Donald Trump’s speech, entitled “Declaring America’s Economic
Independence,” he indicates that blue collar workers are losing jobs, particularly due to global-
ization. Full Transcript: Donald Trump’s Jobs Plan Speech, POLITICO (June 28, 2016, 1:19 PM
EDT), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/full-transcript-trump-job-plan-speech-
224891 (“The legacy of Pennsylvania steelworkers lives in the bridges, railways[,] and skyscrap-
ers that make up our great American landscape. But our workers’ loyalty was repaid with be-
trayal. Our politicians have aggressively pursued a policy of globalization — moving our jobs,
our wealth[,] and our factories to Mexico and overseas.”).
113. See, e.g., Full Text: Donald Trump’s Speech on Fighting Terrorism, POLITICO (Aug. 15,
2016, 3:15 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/where-donald-trump-stands-on-terrorism
(“In the 20th Century, the United States defeated Fascism, Nazism, and Communism. Now, a
different threat challenges our world: Radical Islamic Terrorism.”).
114. Donald J. Trump: Address on Immigration, DONALDJTRUMP.COM (Aug. 31, 2016),
https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-trump-address-on-immigration.
115. Sunstein, supra note 111.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Emma Roller, What Voters Want, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes
.com/2016/01/26/opinion/campaign-stops/what-voters-want.html.
119. Id.
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them . . . . People will actually change their positions to align
with the candidates they prefer, and will also assume that candi-
dates agree with them on important issues, even when that isn’t
true.120
Throughout his campaign, Trump asserted that various authority
figures, often unnamed, approved of him and disapproved of other candi-
dates. For example, Trump has name-dropped Larry Kudlow121 and Lau-
rence Tribe.122 In addition, Trump has often urged people to defer to his
own expertise and authority, even though he offered no evidence to sup-
port the premise that he had any—consider, for example, his assurance
that he knew more about ISIS than “the generals.”123
On a related note, during the campaign Trump also capitalized on
the fact that people look to experts to form their own opinions, something
known as the Asch Effect.124 The Asch Effect finds that high-status indi-
viduals have a stronger likelihood of a subject agreeing with an obviously
false conclusion, when a high-status individual makes that conclusion, de-
spite the subject normally being able to clearly see the answer as incor-
rect.125 This relies in part on the attribute substitution bias and also on
individuals feeling strong emotional pressure to conform to authorities,
who seem to speak for a majority’s position.126 This is similar to attribu-
tion bias because individuals take the decisions of someone they consider
an expert and attribute those decisions to their own decision-making.
C. Availability Bias
Similar to the attribute substitution discussed in Sub-Part B, the
availability heuristic is a mental shortcut that relies on immediate examples
that come to a given person’s mind when evaluating a specific topic or
120. Id.
121. Eric Kanakowi, CNBC’s Awful Trump Interview Highlights its Larry Kudlow Problem,
MEDIA MATTERS (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.mediamatters.org/blog/2016/02/09/cnbcs-aw
ful-trump-interview-highlights-its-larr/208470 (quoting Trump as tweeting: “Highly Respected
economist @Larry_Kudlow is a big fan of my tax plan— thank you, Larry”).
122. Ben Jacobs, Harvard Scholar: Ted Cruz’s Citizenship, Eligibility for President ‘Unsettled,’
THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jan/11/lau
rence-tribe-ted-cruz-donald-trump-citizen-president.
123. Chris Cillizza, The Dangerous Anger of Donald Trump, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/11/13/the-remarkably-unappeal
ling-anger-of-donald-trump/?utm_term=.c78f46ed8514.
124. S.E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, 193 SCI. AM. 35 (1955). See also Henry T.
Moore, The Comparative Influence of Majority and Expert Opinion, 32 AM. J. PSYCHOLOGY 16
(1921).
125. Id.
126. Vernon L. Allen & John M. Levine, Social Support, Dissent and Conformity, 31 SOCI-
OMETRY 138, 138-149 (1968); see also Saul McLoud, Asch Experiment, SIMPLY PSYCH. (2008),
https://www.simplypsychology.org/asch-conformity.html.
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decision.127 People generally recall examples that evoke a strong emotional
effect, such as fear, pride, hate, disgust, or sadness. Research shows that
people tend to sensationalize the likelihood of unusual events, such as
homicide, terrorist attacks, or airline accidents, while ignoring less sensa-
tional but more realistic possibilities, such as car accidents and death from
common disease.128 This bias is frequently combined with emotional bi-
ases based on evolutionary psychology and the human instinct to avoid fear
or disgust.
Trump effectively used the availability bias during his election cam-
paign. During the Republican primary, when terror attacks occurred in
Paris and then in San Bernardino, he used them as proof that his warnings
about Muslims were justified.129 Trump’s favorable polling rose about 7
points in the aftermath of the attacks, right before he began winning mul-
tiple primary contests.130
Throughout his campaign, Trump effectively fed fears of “the other.”
He famously claimed that “[W]hen Mexico sends its people, they’re not
sending their best. They’re bringing drugs; they’re bringing crime; they’re
rapists.”131 Such statements unabashedly tapped into base fears humans
hold about their own safety.132 That the statement has no factual basis did
not prevent him from saying it or people believing it.
In the same vein, during the Republican National Convention,
Trump mentioned the tragic story of a young woman killed by an illegal
immigrant, again feeding on fears of personal safety. Trump omitted a crit-
ical fact from the narrative: the act was not a violent crime, but a drunk
driving accident.133 The young woman could just as easily have been killed
by a middle-aged White male driving home from the Republican National
Convention.
Playing on fear can be very powerful, using System 1 thinking to shut
down any System 2 processes.134 By giving us vivid examples of a situa-
127. PLOUS, supra note 72, at 121–31.
128. Id.
129. Molly Ball, Donald Trump and the Politics of Fear, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2, 2016), http://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/donald-trump-and-the-politics-of-fear/49811
6.
130. Id.
131. Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Donald Trump’s False Comments Connecting Mexican Immigrants
and Crime, WASH. POST (July 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/
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132. Ball, supra note 129.
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tion, even when those examples are rare or were incorrectly described,
Trump capitalized on the fears of his audience and played into their natural
predisposition to default to System 1 thinking. In such a context, the mar-
ketplace of ideas becomes a marketplace of free-floating anxieties.
D. Group-Based Biases
Group-based biases occur when individuals who are part of a group
tend to see that group in a more positive manner compared to other
groups.135 Politics, especially American politics with its two-party system,
inherently creates group-based biases. Partisan bias affects how an individ-
ual views policies, including the state of the economy, for example, even
when objective factors would show the view to be incorrect. A Gallup poll
in November of 2016 asked people one week before the election and one
week after the election the following question: Is the economy getting
better or worse? As the following chart136 shows, in less than fourteen
days, people changed their response, even though logically, there was no
reason for such a drastic change regarding the current state of the
economy.137
135. Mina Cikara & Jay Van Bevel, The Neuroscience of Intergroup Relations: An Integrative
Review, PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI., http://www.psych.nyu.edu/vanbavel/lab/documents/
Cikara.VanBavel.inpress.PopS.IntergroupNeuroscience.pdf.
136. Philip Bump, And Just Like That, Republicans Are Pretty Confident in Where the Economy
Is Headed, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/
2016/11/15/and-just-like-that-republicans-are-pretty-confident-in-where-the-economy-is-
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The response from both Republicans and Democrats suggests that people
are making policy judgments based on impressions or predispositions, not
on actual or objective information.138
Psychologist Gordon Allport captured the fallacy of in-group and
out-group biases in his seminal book, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE.139 His
research shows that “all groups develop a way of living with characteristic
codes and beliefs, standards, and enemies to suit their own adaptive
needs—the  pressures keep each individual member in line.”140 The for-
mation of an in-group necessarily yields an out-group, people who consti-
tute the ‘other’ and who can become the enemy of people in the initial in-
group. The “in-group is psychologically primary . . . and hostility towards
out-groups helps strengthen a sense of belonging.”141 This group-based
bias creates partisanship and probably also drives ethnocentric and race-
based views that influence political decisions.
During the election, Trump frequently used false dichotomies to
capitalize on perceived conflicts between the interests of American citizens
and others in the world or even between different races and groups of
Americans themselves. For example, speaking about China, Vietnam, and
India, Trump declared that “our jobs are being stolen . . .  like candy from
a baby.”142 He also stated that “Syrians are now being caught at the south-
ern border . . . . We don’t know who they are, could be ISIS.”143 And, as
noted above, Trump villainized Mexicans as a threat to U.S. interests.144
Disagreeing with these statements might lead to in-group members label-
ing dissenters as anti-American, using group-based biases to isolate
dissenters.
Domestically, Trump used in-group and out-group biases to create
distinctions between Blacks, Whites, Hispanics, Muslims, and more. For
example, Trump falsely tweeted that Blacks killed 81% of White homicide
victims in 2015, relying on a non-existent statistic from a non-existent
organization.145 The following chart shows exactly how inflated Trump’s
false statistics were:146
138. Id.
139. GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (Basic Books 1979).
140. Id.
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142. Sally Kohn, Nothing Donald Trump Says on Immigration Holds Up, TIME (June 29,
2016), http://time.com/4386240/donald-trump-immigration-arguments.
143. Stephanie Condon, Fact Checking 2016 Candidates on Syrian Refugees, CBS NEWS
(Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/media/fact-checking-2016-candidates-on-syrian-
refugees/4.
144. Lee, supra note 131.
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266 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 22:243
COMPARING TRUMP’S RACIAL STATISTICS TO ACTUAL STATISTICS
Trump FBI
Number Number Error factor
Blacks killed by Whites 2% 8% 4 times
Blacks killed by Blacks 97% 90% A little off
Whites killed by Whites 16% 82% 5.4 times [sic] 147
Whites killed by Blacks 81% 15% 5.4 times
Individuals often afford purported authority figures, like Trump,
much more leeway, giving the authority figure the benefit of the doubt.
This authority bias can also exacerbate any existing in-group bias in White
voters. And combining biases with emotional triggers, such as economic
anxiety and fear for safety, leads to further stereotyping and generalization
as System 1 responses begin to overtake System 2 considerations of oppos-
ing viewpoints.
E. Compounding Biases
As the prior descriptions demonstrate, one can attribute the pervasive
nature of these cognitive biases to the fact that many of these biases bolster
each other, making it exponentially more difficult to resist System 1 think-
ing. Although it may be possible to identify reasons other than cognitive
biases to explain Trump’s inaccurate statements above, there is one in-
stance where only cognitive biases will explain the public reaction to
Trump’s comments.
In October 2016, just one month before the 2016 election, the
Washington Post obtained a video of Donald Trump having an “extremely
lewd conversation about women in 2005.”148 Donald Trump said, “I’m
automatically attracted to beautiful [women]—I just start kissing them.
It’s like a magnet. Just kiss. I don’t even wait. And when you’re a star they
let you do it. You can do anything . . . Grab them by the pussy. You can do
anything.”149 Members of Trump’s own party called the remarks “totally
inappropriate and offensive,”150 “vile,”151 and “repugnant and unaccept-
147. Note that when the authors of this article did the math, the error rate appears to be
5.125, not 5.4 as the source erroneously reported.
148. David A. Fahrenthold, Trump Recorded Having Extremely Lewd Conversation About
Women in 2005, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
trump-recorded-having-extremely-lewd-conversation-about-women-in-2005/2016/10/07/3b9
ce776-8cb4-11e6bf8a3d26847eeed4_story.html?postshare=2491475870527101&tid=ss_tw&
utm_term=.ccbabc92b1fd.
149. Ben Mathis-Lilley, Trump Was Recorded in 2005 Bragging About Grabbing Women “By
the Pussy,” SLATE (Oct. 7, 2016, 4:27 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/10/
07/donald_trump_2005_tape_i_grab_women_by_the_pussy.html.
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able in any circumstance.”152 Following sharp criticism, Trump issued a
short statement saying that “this was locker-room banter, a private conver-
sation that took place many years ago. Bill Clinton has said far worse to me
on the golf course—not even close . . . . I apologize if anyone was of-
fended.”153 Trump validated his comments by calling them locker-room
talk, an attempt to normalize what some said “amounts to [describing]
sexual assault.”154 The entire sequence of events, and the results of the
succeeding election, demonstrates cognitive biases at work.
Trump’s statements in the 2005 video reflect generalizations about
women and their roles in our society. He assigns a universal characteristic
to all women (“they”). And he then reduces women to sexual objects—
indeed, consensual sexual objects—who are attracted to celebrity status
and power. These statements play on stereotypes that treat women as a
homogenous group and then assign characteristics to them that men wish
to project.
But it does not end there. Trump’s October 2016 justification for his
prior comments relied on cognitive biases. By saying that he was just en-
gaging in “locker-room banter,”155 Trump stereotyped men. In order to
justify his broad generalizations about how women act, Trump made broad
generalizations about how men talk about women.156 Of course, it is im-
portant to note that these statements do not just play on stereotypes—they
play on false stereotypes. Trump offered no evidence in support of his
claims that all women are alike, that all are willing to become consensual
sexual objects in the presence of a powerful male, or that men commonly
talk about their non-consensual sexual advances on unwilling women.
One might expect that Trump’s comments would have hurt his
chances with religious voters and women voters. To the contrary, Trump
did much better than pollsters expected with both of those groups. Instead
of voting for Hillary Clinton or even a third party, many voters in both of
these groups still cast their lot with Donald Trump as President.157 Steven
Pinker, a Harvard psychologist, argued that Trump’s “libertine and irrelig-
ious lifestyle,” as evidenced by his 2005 comments “should have, but did
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Men say this is not typical locker-room banter. See, e.g., Sally Jenkins, Donald Trump’s
Idea of ‘Locker Room Talk is as Demeaning to Men as it is to Women, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/redskins/donald-trumps-idea-of-locker-room-talk-is-
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not, poison him with evangelicals.”158 Exit polls showed that four out of
five white evangelicals still voted for Trump.159 Democrats also expected
fewer women to vote for Trump after his crass comments. Polls found that
“Trump had nearly equal support among Republican men and women,
and numbers showed that the Republican faithful—men and women—
were supporting their nominee at rates similar to . . . past presidential
elections.”160 Despite Trump’s comments, Clinton lost the votes of White
women overall.161
Trump’s 2016 campaign thus did not just rely upon stereotypes that
activate System 1 thinking and other compromised analytics. It relied upon
the compounding of such stereotypes. This sort of layering did not occur
just once. To the contrary, his remarks often triggered multiple stereo-
types, as when he portrayed Mexicans as drug-runners and rapists and
other sorts of non-specified criminals.
CONCLUSION
AND PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS
ON WAYS FORWARD
The challenge before us seems clear. We have historically depended
on the testing power of the marketplace of ideas to expose factual false-
hoods and to resist, in Brandeis’s memorable phrase, “noxious doctrine.”
In reality, however, the assumptions embedded in the model have never
aligned particularly well with the realities of human cognition, decision-
making, and behavior. The 2016 election brought this misalignment to the
forefront, fully demonstrating the difficulties we encounter in unseating
ideas that are driven by System 1 thinking, that come to us as anchors, that
confirm our biases and stereotypes, and that play upon our fears and anxie-
ties. As one of the authors has declared elsewhere, in 2016 the marketplace
of ideas “crashed.”162 How do we pull the market out of its current
disarray?
If the challenge seems clear, then the solution does not. After all, the
diagnostics applied above strongly suggest that hopeful thinking that the
158. Id.
159. Some voters justified their vote for Trump by relying on fallacious thinking as well.
Some claimed that because Presidents Kennedy and Johnson were womanizers or immoral, issues
of morality should not matter to the presidency. Steve McQuilkin, White Evangelicals Just Elected
a Thrice-Married Blasphemer: What That Means for the Religious Right, USA TODAY (Nov. 10,
2016, 4:23 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/11/10/conser
vative-christians-boorish-trump/9357 2474.
160. Clare Malone, Clinton Couldn’t Win Over White Women, FIVE THIRTY EIGHT (Nov.
9, 2016, 7:16 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/clinton-couldnt-win-over-white-
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162. Len Niehoff, The Marketplace of Ideas Has Crashed, DETROIT NEWS (Dec. 1, 2016),
http://www.detroitnews.com/story/opinion/2016/12/01/marketplace-ideas/94692632.
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market will revive has little basis in the current science of cognitive bias.
We have shown ourselves to be resolutely impervious to new information
and passionately dedicated to beliefs in which we have already invested,
regardless of whether they have any basis in fact. Facts from one source
alone are not likely to mean much to those who have developed a deep
instinctive fondness for a position through the quick and easy thinking that
characterizes System 1 processes.
Because scholars continue to study the dynamics of the 2016 elec-
tion, our thinking remains necessarily preliminary, but we see two possible
avenues for curative steps. First, we will need to adjust our understanding
of the amount of evidence that is required to destabilize people from set-
tled views. The research suggests that this requires substantial amounts of
data, as well as some concrete and specific motivation for change.163 An
example of this sort of change is evident in responses to the Birther move-
ment.164 In the case of President Obama, people who already dislike him
may have little motivation to change their beliefs about where he was
born.165 Until there was overwhelming evidence of President Obama’s
birthplace, namely his actual birth certificate, some people refused to be-
lieve what he said.
To put the matter in legal terms, we will need to adjust our thinking
from “preponderance of evidence” arguments to “clear and convincing
evidence” arguments, if not even arguments “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
And we will have to explain, with exquisite clarity, the adverse conse-
quences of error. It is possible that rational anxieties (e.g., around the gov-
ernmental registration of individuals based on their religious beliefs) may
be able to overcome irrational ones (e.g., that most members of a religious
group represent a threat to personal safety).166
We might think of this as constantly striving toward the “tipping
point” at which people can be persuaded to change their minds. There are
some signs of promise here: for example, research indicates that people
confronted about their negative misconceptions about immigration statis-
tics “became more likely to view immigrants favorably and more likely to
163. David P. Redlawsk, A Matter of Motivated ‘Reasoning,’ N.Y. TIMES (April 22, 2011),
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donate money to a pro-immigration charity.”167 Perhaps even “a slight
nudge—just providing a little factual information—can affect how some
people think,” by creating a tipping point at which people bring their
views in line with fact and reason.168
While this tipping point may prove difficult to find, political scientists
Redlawsk and Civettini have conducted multiple studies to show that it
does indeed exist.169 Ironically, it seems that the cure for the anxiety that
drives bad decisions may reside in qualitatively different anxiety: the pro-
viding of sufficient facts to create within an individual some apprehension
about whether they have in fact arrived at the truth.170 At that point, anxi-
ety may prompt individuals to switch to System 2 processing, carefully
“consider[ing] new information and potentially overrid[ing] existing af-
fective expectations.”171 Without a level of data bombardment that breeds
its own anxiety, however, it seems unlikely that mere counter-factual argu-
ment will destabilize settled misconceptions.
Second, it seems clear that there must also be a change in how issues
are framed for people who may not agree with the facts about hot-button
issues like immigration, global warming, and race relations. Professor
Kahan, who predicted the polarization of American culture, studied how
people responded to framing about polarizing issues by sending letters
about global warming.172 He found that conservatives were “much more
open to accepting the fact that humans are causing global warming” when
“the science had been written into an alternative narrative that appealed to
their pro-industry worldview.”173 People were more likely to respond pos-
itively when a business or religious leader, speaking in a context different
from environmentalists or scientists, provided views on political issues.174
Kahan and others have suggested that instead of leading with the facts in
order to convince reasoners motivated against your beliefs, one should lead
with the values— “so as to give the facts a fighting chance.”175
This point has not only strategic but normative appeal. After all, the
message of the social science is that truth is more likely to prevail if
presented in a way that stresses the similarity of values, rather than the
difference. This Article argues for unifying narratives that invite the audi-
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ence in, rather than polarizing narratives that are likely to drive people
back into the comfortable places of their accepted truths. In any event, the
election of 2016 made this reality abundantly clear: in the marketplace of
ideas, we cannot assume that the truth will sell itself or that it will not need
our help to close the deal.
